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Bulletin de l'APAD
Competition over jurisdictions and
political manoeuvers in Niger
Christian Lund
Résumé
1 Récemment,  le  Niger  a  vécu  une  transformation  politique  vers  la  démocratie  et  le
pluralisme et  le  remplacement  du  gouvernement  autocratique  par  un gouvernement
démocratique a donné l'espoir que l'Etat sera doté d'une nouvelle légitimité.
2 Néanmoins, la situation économique du pays est pitoyable et les nouveaux politiciens ne
sont  en  mesure  ni  d'éprouver  la  croissance  économique  ni  de  promouvoir  un
développement social à court ou moyen terme. Le domaine où le rendement politique est
immédiat et plus intéressant est aussi le domaine où la compétition politique pourrait
mettre en cause la crédibilité et la légitimité du nouveau système politique ; notamment
le domaine des processus juridiques et surtout les litiges fonciers. Depuis 1986, le foncier
a été actualisé à travers l'élaboration d'un Code Rural qui vise à transformer les droits
fonciers  coutumiers  en  droits  fonciers  privés.  La  coïncidence  du  processus  de
démocratisation avec l'actualisation du foncier compose le thème de l'article. A travers
un nombre d'études de cas détaillées, l'engagement de partis politiques dans le processus
juridique est analysé et le risque que cela pose pour la légitimité du nouveau régime est
discuté.
Introduction
3 In several African states democracy and political pluralism have been celebrated in the
1990's. In Niger 17 years of military and one‑party rule was thus in 1991 replaced by a
sovereign National  Conference which issued a  new constitution operating with multi
party democracy. Hopes have been high that a democratic government would replace the
autocratic one‑party rule and would endow the state with a new legitimacy.
4 Democracy rests on some degree of accountability and open competition for political
support  has  become omnipresent  in  public  life  in  Niger.  Already  since  the  death  of
president  Kountché  in  1987,  political  debate  and  competition  had  grown to  become
intense. In particular, the confrontation between the MNSD (Mouvement National pour la
Société de Développement), representing the old regime, on the one hand, and an alliance
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of parties with CDS (Convention Démocratique et Sociale) as the most prominent one,
arguing for "change", on the other hand, has penetrated and shaped the political arena.
5 One of  the  areas  where  the  immediate  political  pay  off  is  highest  is  one  where  the
political competition might put the credibility and legitimacy of the new political system
most at risk. It is the area of legal procedures and in particular the legal disputes over
land.  Land tenure has been highly actualized as a political  issue since 1986 with the
announcement of a tenure reform whose basic idea has been securing rights in land by
transforming traditional rights of tenure into private ownership. The task of overseeing
this process has been put into the hands of a new local tenure commission 1. 
6 The conjuncture of democratization, on the one hand, and land tenure as a political issue,
on the other hand, is the focus of the present paper.
Democratization, politization and legitimacy
7 The  politicization  of  the  legal  procedures  raises  important  questions  about  the
correspondence between legitimacy and effective jurisdictions. As Moore (1988 : 170) puts
it : "In analyzing the legitimacy of a state one must keep distinct at least two aspects : 1)
the nature of the claim to legitimacy and 2) the motives of its citizens when they subject
to authority," i.e. accept certain jurisdictions.
8 Reinstating a democratic constitution makes legality the overall reference point for the
state's  legitimacy.  This is  particularly true for the legal  sphere 2.  Legitimacy of  state
institutions implies a recognition and thus an appreciation of them, and this is intimately
linked to the concepts of justice and propriety. Completely opportunistic and situational
submission to a state institution and erratic recognition of its jurisdiction can hardly be
considered effects of legitimacy. The litmus test of an institution's legitimacy would thus
be that its decisions are generally accepted even in spite of them being unfavorable for
meeting immediate specific interests.
9 Of course, it would be unreasonable to expect that a military regime should turn into a
democratic state over night and thereby endow its institutions, in particular its legal
institutions,  with  a  new  legitimacy.  The  question  is  rather  whether  the  process  of
democratization  seems  to  be  conducive  for  endowing  the  legal  institutions  with
increasing legitimacy or not. 
10 One of the themes in the democratization process in Niger has long been the question of
decentralization. Basically, deconcentration has always been the predominant feature of
the government administration set up with Préfets and Sous‑Préfets appointed by the
government  as  the  representatives  of  each  ministry  at  the  Département  and
Arrondissement levels respectively. However, the new constitution operates with future
democratic assemblies at the Arrondissement level, and the question is how the prospects
of devolution to democratic assemblies influence the legitimacy of the legal institutions.
11 In the following I shall outline the Nigerien background for raising these questions. First,
the legal system concerned with land tenure and the process which put land tenure high
up on the political agenda will be described. Thereafter, I shall sketch out the nature of
the political competition at the local level which preceded and led to the democratic
competition of the present.
Background Land tenure
12 Land tenure had only quite recently and gradually regained access to the political agenda.
During the military regime, president Kountché in 1974 declared that the land belonged
to the tiller of the soil. It was declared that all land, no matter how it had been acquired
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and no matter under which tenure rules it was held, should henceforth belong as private
property to the person cultivating it. This provoked a number of conflicts between users
and owners of the land in which the latter defied the declaration and insisted that a tithe
be paid in recognition of their ownership. Many of the conflicts arising from Kountché's
declaration were  not  resolved.  In  1977  the  government  therefore  issued a  circulaire
prohibiting any land tenure dispute resolution by any local authority, governmental or
traditional.
13 This in turn led to a situation of precarious stability. Tithe was often still paid recognizing
that  the  land  belonged  to  the  owner  and  not  to  the  cultivator  ‑  a  defiance  of  the
Kountché‑decree. However, the use right holder stayed on the land.
14 Since all institutions had been stripped of their competences in land tenure questions by
the  government,  no  conflict  had  a  predictable  course  and  none  of  the  institutions
operating in the rural areas had formal powers to deal with land conflicts.  However,
neither conflicts, their sources nor the institutions disappeared, but it all became much
more discreet, informal and precarious. Generally, 6 different politico‑legal institutions
were the targets of the plaintiffs for settlement of conflicts. While all informally involved
in  dispute  processing,  each  institution  had  its  primary  domain.  The  administrative
structure with the Prefet, the Sous‑prefet and the Chef de Poste. The traditional structure
with the Sultan, the Chef de Canton and the Chef de Village for the sedentary farming
communities and the Chef de Groupement and Chef de Tribu for the original pastoralists ‑
now largely sedentarized ‑communities. The legal structure with the courts. The police
with  the  gendarmerie.  And  fmally  the  Kadi  who  heads  the  religious  structure  and
interprets the Islamic law.
 
Figure 1 : institutions dealing with in land conflicts
Adm.
Traditional
farmers
Traditional
Pastoralists
Legal Police Religion
Préfét Sultan Chef de Groupe
Juge  de
paix
Gendarmerie Kadi
Sous‑Préfet Chef de canton Chef de tribu    
Chef  de
Poste
Chef de village     
15 The formal prohibition of any of these institutions dealing with tenure meant that while
each  institution  was  organized  hierarchically,  between  them  only  indirectly  a  tacit
hierarchy  existed.  Thus,  the  administrative  hierarchy  made  the  Canton  chiefs  the
auxiliary staff of the Sous‑Préfet. But complementarity as well as competition between
different illicit but effective jurisdictions characterized the legal system.
16 In  1986  a  process  of  establishing  a  new  land  tenure  reform  ‑the  Rural  Code  ‑  was
undertaken. The reinstatement of land tenure on the political agenda was then furthered
during the National Conference in 1991. Characteristic of the National Conference was the
proposed reversal of almost any law or decree passed during the military regime. All
remnants of the old regime were foul and should give way for "change". And although it
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was not part of the final declaration, it had been voiced ‑ and heard ‑ that now was the
time  for  people  to  claim  the  property  that  they  had  lent  or  hired  to  others  and
subsequently lost due to the Kountché‑decree. As the tenure disputes were no longer
illegal, the tacit hierarchy going from the Chef de Village over the Chef de Canton to the
Sous‑Préfet was now recognized as an official hierarchy for dispute settlements with the
Juge de Paix as the final instance if a settlement could not be obtained. Complementarity
and competition did, however, not disappear.
Political competition
17 While social and political struggle are immanent in all societies, overt contestation of
government and public political competition are not. During the military regime from
1974 to 1991 only the military's party ‑ MNSD ‑ was authorized to conduct politics. And
the regime managed to quell political opposition until the death of president Kountché in
1987.
18 From  the  late  1980's,  however,  a number  of  organizations  began  to  operate  under
politically  innocent  names  and  programs.  One  of  these,  the  Association  Mutualiste
d'Animation Culturelle et Artistique (AMACA), was thus brought into being in 1989 by
intellectuals from the country's second city ‑ Zinder. The real objectives were to protect
the interests  of  these  predominantly  Zinder‑Hausa civil  servants  against  the  historic
Djerma favoritism prevailing in the state apparatus and to favor their region ‑ Zinder ‑ in
the national development. The modus operandus of this organization quickly became one
of mutual help and defense against abuse from the authorities and AMACA recruited
extensively  among non‑intellectuals.  Thus,  people  found in AMACA intellectuals  who
would  assist  them  when  they  encountered  trouble  with  government  officials  or
traditional chiefs ; with an AMACA‑militant by the side, a farmer was less liable to be
subjected to the arbitrariness of a gendarme looking for a bribe or Canton chief trying to
expropriate their land. Furthermore, if a farmer was arrested with illegally cut wood and
had his donkey confiscated by the patrols of the Service de l'Environnement, the leaders
of AMACA in Zinder would raise the funds among members to pay the fine. This was
facilitated by the membership of wealthy businessmen from Zinder town. They would pay
the small fine of 2.000 FCFA and in return get the delinquent out of trouble and receive
his loyalty for it. The businessman, on the other hand, could count on AMACA if his truck
full  of  goods from Nigeria was held back at the customs office.  In a matter of hours
AMACA could mobilize hundreds of militants who would harass the customs officers to
release  the  goods  and  not  report  further.  This  set‑up  was  very  dynamic ;  AMACA
delivered what the members needed without being 100 fussy about the legality of its acts.
19 In  1993  multi  party  elections  were  held  for  the  first  time  in  decades  and  AMACA
converted itself into a political party ‑CDS. During the political campaign prior to the
elections, the official CDS slogans were much centered around bringing back justice to the
people,  fighting  government  officials'  abuse  of  power  etc.  During  the  heat  of  the
campaign, slogans and policy promises were often given an extra twist to become more
catchy for  the rural  electorate :  abolition of  the traditional  chieftaincy,  of  the forest
guards and of  taxation,  and retrial  of  all  unjust  trials  made by the MNSD controlled
administration and traditional chiefs were tempting promises to make. In particular, it
was brought forth in the propaganda that land lost due to expropriation or rigged trials
conducted  by  the  tradition  al  chiefs  were  to  be  handed  back.  Though  not  formally
committed to these promises by any official programme, when the CDS won the elections,
Competition over jurisdictions and political manoeuvers in Niger
Bulletin de l'APAD, 9 | 1995
4
one of the major issues at the local level was the emerging land tenure disputes. And the
promises made by the CDS were largely retained by the rural population.
20 CDS  won  the  majority  in  parliament  in  a  coalition  with  two  other  parties  and
subsequently participated in government. In its nomination of Préfets, Sous‑Préfets and
other important civil servants in the administration, party members were preferred and a
tacit quotation system between the coalition parties was established. In the Département
of Zinder and the Arrondissement of Mariga the Préfet and the Sous‑Préfet put into office
were accordingly out of the CDS quota. It is, however, important to stress, that while
democratization has brought about intense political competition at the local level, the
political and administrative players are accountable to no local democratic institution,
since local assemblies are still not established.
21 The arrival of a very dynamic, delivering and populist party, which contrary to the MNSD,
was separable from the state itself in the sense that it drew its legitimacy from attacks on
the state, added a competing institutional option for dispute settlement to the range of
options already in place as the following cases will demonstrate.
Three cases 3
22 I shall present two examples to illustrate the political parties ‑ i.e. the ruling party CDS ‑
insertion in the legal procedures. The cases are elaborate in order to present some of the
context and historical sequence that the party intervention is interacting with. A third
brief  example serves to illustrate the manoeuvering of  the Sous‑Préfet  in a situation
where  his  various  capacities  elevates  him  out  of  bureaucratic  control  and  into  an
extended discretionary terrain.
23 The influence of the political parties is exercised in several ways. It ranges from simple
brokerage between a plaintiff and some public authority, over conducting hearings and
providing settlements under a quasi‑formal ritual,  to more stealthily activating party
members holding key‑positions within the administration thus capable of influencing the
outcome of legal procedures.
Settlements
24 A land tenure dispute had occurred between Saley and Djibo in a village in the Canton de
Gao in 1994. Saley had c1aimed some land back from Djibo who denied that Saley had any
such rights. When Saley had first tried to let Djibo be summoned at the Chef de Canton's
court for settlement of the dispute, Djibo had managed to pay off the bailiff not to be able
to find him. Subsequently the case was postponed and would allow Djibo to cultivate the
land, if he managed to plant his crop before the case was reopened.
25 When the rainy season began, however, both Djibo and Saley began to cultivate ;  one
planting on what the other had planted. Saley went to the Chef de Canton who dismissed
him referring to the commenced cropping season and the closure of the land litigation
season. Saley then went to the local member of parliament, Yaccouba Mato, to complain.
Yaccouba Mato suggested patience and to take up the case next year. Dissatisfied with
this advise, Saley went to consult one of the more militant CDS‑cadres, Zakari Ousseini,
and explained his situation. Zakari Ousseini and an associate of his went with Saley to the
village  where  Djibo  was  taken  by  surprise.  Zakari  Ousseini  scolded  Djibo  for  not
respecting a summons, and then he let both parties present their case. After having heard
them,  Zakari  Ousseini  offered  Saley  to  take  a  Coranic  oath  which  he  did.  Utterly
unprepared for this, Djibo accepted Saley's oath and ceded the field in question to Saley.
Later, after having consulted friends and relatives, Djibo mounted enough courage to go
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to  the  Chef  de  Canton to  corn  plain  about  the  procedure.  The  Chief  dismissed  him
referring to the cropping season, and suggested that Djibo took up the case with the
Sous‑Préfet after the harvest.
26 Several elements in this course of events merit a comment. First, it is obvious that the
CDS  cadres  do  not  subscribe  to  a  uniform  approach  towards  demands  for  their
intervention. And Zakari Ousseini used the occasion to compete with Yaccouba Mato in
rendering  justice.  He  most  likely  scored  a  few points  against  Yaccouba  Mato  as  the
committed cadre who could not ignore injustice. Second, the combination of surprise, the
authority of the president's party and the use of the Coran and the Coranic oath whose
legal validity cannot be disputed without the risk of loosing one's honor, made it virtually
impossible for Djibo to oppose the procedure and the result. Third, when the Chef de
Canton  learnt  about  the  settlement  and  Zakari  Ousseini's  and  CDS'  involvement,  he
transferred the reopening of the case away from himself, because the chiefs "do not do
politics", and directed it towards the Sous‑Préfecture.
27 When discussing  the  case  with  Zakari  Ousseini,  he  denied  having  conducted  a  legal
procedure ; he would, as he said, never do that ‑ he was not an official authority. He had
merely witnessed a fanner take an oath, since no other authority [sic !] was willing to
assist and endow the ceremony with an official tinge. However, while the procedure was a
simulation of an officially recognized legal procedure, it was effective and real enough to
make the land change hands. At least for one cropping season.
28 Discussing the case with the Sous‑Préfet, he stated that the incident was not unique :
"The formal hierarchy is "burnt" [brûlée/not respected] all the time and the political
parties  intervene  and  set  themselves  up  as  a  parallel  justice.  It  is  a  non‑sense".
Nevertheless, he knew about the actual case but had not reacted upon it. He had, as he
said, not been informed. By that meaning not informed in a way he could not ignore.
Activating party influence on key positions in the administration
29 A tenure dispute had come about between Mamane and Idi in a village in the Canton de
Gao. Mamane's mother, her sister and their brother Elli. Ali had inherited their father's
land some time in the 1930's.  Mamane's unde, Elli.  Ali,  then went on a pilgrimage to
Mekka, left the land with his sisters, and never returned.
30 In  1951  Idi's  father  and  halfbrother  to  Elh.  Ali  (same  mother)  returned  from  his
pilgrimage to Mekka stating that he had met Elli. Ali, and that Elli. Ali had lent him the
land he had inherited in the 1930's. Mamane's mother and aunt refused at first, but when
Idi's father  had  them  summoned  before  the  Sultan  of  Zinder  and  there  produced
witnesses to his and Elli. Ali's agreement, they ceded the field the him as a loan.
31 When Idi's father died in 1972, Mamane addressed Idi to daim the field. Idi now refused
that the field was only a loan, and a court settlement in Zinder ensued. Here, the same
witnesses as in 1951 testified that the field was indeed a loan. A letter stating this was
issued, but Idi requested that he could continue the cultivate the land for another year,
granting him time to find another field. Mamane conceded to this.
32 In 1974 a military coup brought Kountché into power. When he first declared that the
land belonged to the tiller of the soil, and later in 1977 furthermore prohibited any local
or traditional authority from dealing with tenure matters, Mamane had to let the case lie
‑ but he was fairly confident since he had the magistrate's letter.
33 The case erupted again in 1992, when Idi's sister summoned him to the Chef de Canton
charging him with keeping some of the family's land out of  the division of property
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following the death of their father. She pointed to the field that Elli. Ali had transferred to
their father and requested it be divided among the heirs. Idi was forced to cali Mamane to
testify  that  the  field  was not  his  family's  property  and  subsequently  should  not  be
distributed  among the  heirs.  But  this  was  a  dangerous  step.  Mamane now used  the
occasion to claim the land back. Idi objected to this ; "he had just saved Mamane's land
from expropriation ‑ and was this a way of thanking him". Not able to reach a settlement,
the Chef de Canton transferred the dispute to the magistrate in Zinder. Idi now managed
to produce a number of postponements, in particular by bringing new aspects into the
case. Most important was the claim that while some of the land was indeed a loan, most of
what was now claimed by Mamane, used in fact to belong to Elli. Ali's and Idi's father's
common mother, and thus not to the sisters of Elh. Ali (Le. Mamane's mother and aunt).
The claim was not taken into consideration, and when Moussa Idi requested to take a
Coranic oath to back his statement, it was denied him by the magistrate who settled the
case by granting Mamane the land. At this point the magistrate issued a preliminary,
handwritten court ruling, stating that the land should return to Mamane. Mamane took
possession of the land and planted ‑ to be sure ‑well before the beginning of the rainy
season.
34 Idi was not satisfied with the situation ‑loosing the land his family had cultivated since
the 1950's.  As he was one of  the village's  known CDS supporters,  he went to the MP
Yaccouba Mato in Mariga to ask for help. Yaccouba Mato would not engage himself since
the magistrate had already issued a preliminary ruling, and Idi went to Zakari Ousseini.
He, in turn, accompanied Idi to the CDS polit bureau in Zinder where a CDS cadre took
him to the Préfet. After having heard him, the Préfet telephoned to the Sous‑Préfet in
Mariga and urged him to do something. The Préfet suggested that Idi summoned Mamane
before the Sous‑Préfet,  which he did.  At  the scheduled hearing,  the Sous‑Préfet  told
Mamane that the settlement granting him the land was valid for this year only, and that
the dispute would be tried again after the harvest. He added this on the magistrate's
handwritten court ruling which Mamane kept.
35 The case is thus still in suspension, and ail await the reopening of the season for land
litigation.
36 The first thing to notice about a case like this is that it dates so far back and contains no
written contracts between the opposed parties that simple proof is difficult to produce.
While  mutually  contradictory,  neither  of  the  parties'  arguments  are  completely
unreasonable or improbable. And the winner is the one given the most accommodating
interpretation.
37 Second, the case had, by the intervention of the magistrate, reached a level of authority
which was no match for at simple settlement by a local party cadre as in the previous
example. It required not only the intervention of from a high ranking government official
‑  the  Sous‑Préfet  ‑  but  even  the  leverage  from his  superior  for  him to  do  so.  The
Sous‑Préfet  demonstrated developed skills  for walking on a razor's  edge.  On the one
hand, he owes it to the party and his superior (as well as to himself) to take action at their
request. His endurance and promotion chances lie in the hands of the CDS so long as the
quotation system works and the CDS is in power. On the other hand, once the case falls
within the magistrate's jurisdiction, he has no longer formal say in it The comments he
had added on the preliminary transcript on the court ruling was therefore not a direct
contradiction of the magistrate's decision ‑ only a restriction of it's validity to one year
and an announcement of a forthcoming appeal. The Sous‑Préfet managed to fashion his
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intervention  in  a  way  in  which  everybody  ‑  the  disputing  parties,  the  CDS  and  the
magistrate ‑ knew he was disapproving and suspending the magistrate's decision but still
prevented  the  magistrate  from  denouncing  his  actions  publicly.  As  the  magistrate
explained : "If I took his illegal behavior seriously and denounced it, it would only mean
that the people would take it even more seriously and accept it as something important.
The legal terms are even misspelled and it is an entire nonsense". The magistrate might
be right that open contestation of the Sous‑Préfet's behavior would merely endow it with
more importance, but on the other hand, ignoring it did not make it undone either.
38 The intervention by the Sous‑Préfet could turn out to be successful, since the case is now
pending and the magistrate is transferred to another district and being replaced by a new
magistrate who might review the case differently considering the plausibility of both
litigants' versions.
Room for manoeuvre for the Sous‑Préfet
39 A dispute had occurred over a cattle corridor in a village in the Canton of Gao. Omar and a
group of villagers neighboring a cattle corridor had objected to the use of the corridor by
the cattle of Saley and another group of villagers. While Omar would concede to let the
corridor be used by people bringing their cattle to the market, since the cattle would be
guarded by the adult person wanting to sell it, and be few in numbers, he resisted that the
corridor was used for the villagers' cattle to reach a small pasture, since they would then
only be herded by young boys and be more numerous and thus cause more crop damage.
40 When Omar had prohibited Saley from passing, Saley had contacted the Sous‑Préfecture
in order to complain about it The Sous‑Préfet went out to the village assisted by the Chef
de Service de l'Environnement who also happened to be the permanent secretary of the
tenure commission. They were accompanied by two Gardes Républicains. A meeting was
held  in  the  village  and  resulted  in  Omar  accepting  Saley's  use  of  the  corridor.  The
Sous‑Préfet declared that the sanctity of the corridor was henceforth protected by the
Coran, and the settlement was taken down in writing.
41 Two weeks later, Omar and his neighbors begun to extend their fields and plant their
crops in the corridor thus annihilating it, and the dispute erupted again. Saley notified
the Sous‑Préfet who sent out a team consisting of the Assistant Sous‑Préfet and the Chef
de Service de l'Environnement and had them accompanied by two Gardes Républicains.
The  Sous‑Préfet  instructed  them  to  arrest  and  bring  back  to  Mariga  anyone  who
disregarded the earlier settlement
42 At the village a heated debate ensued and went on for about one hour with the occasional
intervention from the two guards separating the most agitated hot heads with the rifle
butts. Eventually, it was established that Omar and neighbors had indeed planted in the
corridor, and Omar had furthermore issued a Coranic curse on Saley if he would once
again make use of the corridor. The Assistant Sous‑Préfet and the Chef de Service de
l'Environnement  demanded  that  the  earlier  decision  was  respected,  and  Omar  and
neighbors finally conceded to respect the corridor. But Omar would not cancel his curse.
Unable to reach a settlement and convincingly undo the curse and unwilling to arrest half
of the male population in the village, the Assistant Sous‑Préfet and the Chef de Service de
l'Environnement scheduled a new hearing in Mariga for the coming Friday ; three days
away.
43 Come Friday, two groups of about 20 men came from the village to the hearing. Between
Tuesday and Friday, however, a delegation from the village representing Omar Moussa
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had made contact with the Sous‑Préfet one night at his home with the Canton chief’s
representative as an intermediary. On Friday, before the hearing, an ordinary meeting of
the  tenure  commission  was  held  at  the  Sous‑Préfecture.  The  Sous‑Préfet  used  the
occasion to state that he intended to conduct the hearing himself. This was taken as a cue
by both the Assistant Sous‑Préfet and the Chef de Service de l'Environnement not to
attend which, therefore, they did note After the meeting, the Sous‑Préfet gathered the
two groups from the village in the square of the Sous‑Préfecture and declared that while
the cattle corridor had once been respected as such,  it  was never a proper corridor.
Therefore Omar and his neighbors could rightfully extend their fields into the corridor
and cancel it. And if anyone let his animals stray on the former corridor, it would be
considered illegal crop damage. The Sous‑Préfet reminded the two groups that Saley had
used the Coran to protect his fields, and he expected all good muslims to respect that. He
then closed the meeting and sent people home. Saley later made contact with the CDS
polit bureau and the dispute continued.
44 While the tenure commission, including the Sous‑Préfet, his assistant and the Chef de
Service de l'Environnement, had once settled the affair in favor of protection of the cattle
corridor and the free use of it, the Sous‑Préfet undid this decision and settled the case
most differently. When asked about this, neither the Assistant Sous‑Préfet and the Chef
de  Service  de  l'Environnement  would  state  a  clear  reason  but  concurrently  and
independently  suggested  that  the  Sous‑Préfet  bad  stepped  out  of  his  function  as  a
member  and  president  of  the  tenure  commission  and  had  assumed  his  role  as  the
Sous‑Préfet. Overruling the tenure commission's decision from this position would not be
questioned although the Sous‑Préfet  was not  fonnally  entitled to do 80.  While  being
colleagues  on  equal  terms  in  the  tenure  commission,  the  Chef  de  Service  de
l'Environnement did not feel capable of challenging the Sous‑Préfet, who in other matters
is his superior, and he preferred to ignore the incident. The Assistant Sous‑Préfet, being
the immediate subordinate of the Sous‑Préfet,  was even less inclined to question the
validity of the new decision. The Sous‑Préfet himself denied that it had ever happened.
Exploring the paradoxes
45 As the cases indicate, a number of paradoxes seem to emerge from the recent Nigerien
experience. The CDS has so far experienced considerable political progress, but it seems
that the party has begun to be caught up by its own success. The political actions of
challenging  the  state  and  the  traditional  chiefs  by  mounting  pressure  and  erecting
parallel fora of justice were once valiant guerilla tactics. Since the state was run by an
unconstitutional party created and controlled by the military, political sabotage had a
kind of  Robin  Hood‑legitimacy  to  it.  Although the  AMACA/CDS  interference  with  the
administration of justice was often as arbitrary as the administration's operation itself, it
was seen as committed efforts to redress injustice.
46 Later, however, the same tactics have different connotations. When the CDS occupied the
presidency of the republic and was a major partner in the coalition government, it must
abide by the constitution and thus had to recognize the separation of the legislative,
executive and judiciary state powers in order not to become a replica of the old regime.
Paradoxically, the rules and logics of democracy seem to counteract this : elected into
office parties and politicians are there for one term at the time. In order to become
reelected one has to deliver some political results, but the economic quagmire into which
Niger is sinking makes it an impossible task for any government to deliver much tangible
economic and social progress within one election term. Therefore it is tempting to stay
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put on the old hunting ground for popular support and satisfy the electorate through
redressing injustice.
47 It is often argued that rights in land in African societies most often are claimed by virtue
of membership or status in various social groups and that these claims are renegotiated
in the process of changing political relations and social identities. Viewed from this angle,
democracy has not changed access‑rules to land much ; CDS merely erected itself as a
"political tribe" in opposition to the former political power ‑MNSD. "Membership" of the
CDS  became  important  for  claims  in  land  and  this  was  rapidly  recognized  by  the
electorate.  By  first  appearance,  the  support  for  CDS  in  the  rural  areas  seemed
overwhelming, but when probing for reasons for the adherence to the party, the current
answer was that it is wise to back a winner, and when questioning the difference between
the CDS and the MNSD, the standard answer was : "CDS has the power now". It does,
however, not confer legitimacy upon the legal system itself or CDS as its prime governor.
The alternative avenues to justice are not abandoned ; the Sous‑Préfet, the Canton chief
and the magistrate are still addressed for complaints or appeals, and the litigants shop for
the most promising legal forum for a favorable settlement. In this sense, the CDS‑option
had simply widened this range of options.
48 However, it is one thing that people did not go to the CDS because they considered it a
legitimate  state  institution  capable  of  exercising  justice,  but  because  the  party  was
considered the opportune avenue for the specific situation, it is another thing if the party
itself was promoting state legitimacy or not ; increasing the number of legal avenues does
not in itself wear on the state's legitimacy. However, since the underlying raison d'être
for the CDS was to redress injustice, revoking earlier decisions by other institutions was
an important exercise of justification. Furthermore, this reflected neither a consensus
about the rules of  law or consensus about the authority exercising it  since different
norms had been applied and all other legal institutions had, with more or less success,
been tried overruled by the CDS. The operations must therefore be interpreted as not
conducive for endowing the state legal institutions with increasing legitimacy. Rather, it
seems as if the modus operandus contributed to its erosion. While conscious about this,
the party cadres in Mariga and Zinder had difficulties in avoiding it for two reasons. First,
while the CDS had won the elections, the corrupt behavior of chiefs and administrators,
which CDS campaigned against, had not disappeared, and it was tempting to use a new
favorable position to redress injustice by overruling formally responsible institutions.
Second, refraining from intervention would have invited somebody else to do it.
49 Another paradox is rooted in the way that democratization had replaced the one‑party
command over the administration with a manifest competition over the executive ‑ and
thereby  the  judiciary  ‑  between  the  party  politicians  and  the  party  appointed  civil
servants viz. the Sous‑Préfet. Since the governing party no longer had complete control
over the administration but also had a constitution to respect, the Sous‑Préfets could now
manoeuvre  between two masters  ‑  the  constitution and their  party.  The  local  party
cadres like Yaccouba Mato and Zakari Ousseini claimed that they have a legitimate right
to control and oversee the operations of the local administrator who traditionally had
transgressed the limits of his formal attributions extensively. They even competed to be
the more zealous umpire. The Sous‑Préfet, on the other hand, claimed that while he is a
neutral instance, CDS involvement and control was undue politicization. The paradox is
that  while  democratization  had  loosened  the  ruling  political  party's  grip  on  the
administration and the Sous‑Préfet,  the failure to submit him to control  from a new
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democratic  institution released his  powers,  and a new ambiguous dimension of  legal
procedures had come about. 
50 While  this  apparently  is  competition  between  CDS  and  the  administration,  the
controversy actually went on within the party due to the Sous‑Préfet's party political
nomination. A remarkable feature of the party interventions had so far been the absence
of bribes. The return for intervention was popularity and office in the state. A position
from where spoils are easily controlled by the issuing of public contracts,  offering of
employment and through embezzlement. 
51 Tangible gifts had, nevertheless, so far more taken the reverse course ; candidates from
the  CDS distributed  gifts  in  order  to  secure  political  support.  A  person like  the  MP
Yaccouba Mato had thus bought 30 bars of sea salt for 75.000 FCFA, and distributed it in
some 25 villages among the local CDS leaders to secure their support for the forthcoming
nomination of party candidates for parliamentary elections. Others have had boubous
(traditional menswear) tailored and distributed like the Sultan does when catering for his
followers  among  the  traditional  chiefs.  The  Sous‑Préfet,  on  the  other  hand,  had
attempted to buy away Yaccouba Mato's supporters from under him with small public
contracts  and  food  aid  in  order  to  prepare  the  ground  for  another  less  interfering
candidate.
52 The quest for the loyalty of the lower echelons of the party is a quest for two trophies :
One is the image with the local population of the powerful person who can get things
done and, perhaps in particular, undone, and thus become the one whom they address.
The other is the image with the superior party cadres as the one able to mobilize the
electorate.
53 Since the reassertion of  power for  both the Sous‑Préfet  and the local  CDS cadres or
politicians in general rested considerably upon their active intervention and delivery of
"justice", the bitter irony is that whether one or the other will prove to be the most
powerful local actor, it will tend to be at the expense of the legitimacy of the state ‑ in
particular within the local legal domain.
54 A third paradox worth noting pertains to the use of religious legitimation of rights and
truth of statements. In a polycentric legal system marked by institutional competition, it
can seem comforting that at least one set of norms prevails for all engaged institutions.
However,  it  becomes somewhat less of  a  comfort  for the seekers of  order,  when the
contextual employment of religious legitimation is explored.
55 There can be little doubt that the Coran and the Faith as such are highly respected in
Nigerien society and that the fear of committing perjury while under a religious oath is
sincere for most This is an important reason for the frequent resort to the Coran in
conflicts over scarce resources. It is effective. However, the force of a Coranic protection,
a Coranic curse or a Coranic oath seem to be at least partly conditioned on another
authority.  The  litigant  wanting  to  take  a  Coranic  oath  generally  requests  a  political
authority  for  the  licence  to  do  so.  It  is  thus  in  the  hands  of  the  Canton chief,  the
Sous‑Préfet, the magistrate or another political authority to sanction the employment of
this  instrument  for  imbuing  a  decision  with  religious  legitimacy.  In  case  1  of  the
Settlement, it was thus Zakari Ousseini's presence which inflated Saley's Coranic oath
with potency and authority.
56 On the other hand, if someone as Omar from case 3 boldly transgresses the limits of his
own prerogatives  and actually  issues an "un‑authorized" Coranic curse,  intermediary
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political  authorities  like  the  Assistant  Sous‑Préfet  and  the  Chef  de  Service de
l'Environnement were not capable of simply neutralizing it, but had to confer the case to
the Sous‑Préfet. The fact that the Sous‑Préfet did not cancel Omar's curse but used it to
encourage all  to be "good muslims" and respect it,  does not mean that he could not
de‑fuse a curse or back changing statements with his authority ‑ thus, he actually undid
his own earlier Coranic protection of the cattle corridor in his final statement. Rather, it
suggests that the religious rationality interacts with an opportunistic immediate purpose
rationality  making  up  a  disenchanted  composite  and  ambivalent  rationality.  In  the
political  institutions'  competition  over  jurisdictions  the  religious  discourse  therefore
make up important terrain and tradition an important modem strategy.
57 It is evident that the number of tenure disputes which have surfaced in the rural areas in
Niger has soared since the downfall of military role. It would be tempting to argue that
while the military regime had been capable of enforcing tenurial rules, the democratic
regime has been capable of producing nothing but disorder and conflict. Continuing this
line of  argument,  one could hypothesize that  the Rural  Code would have had better
chances  of  smooth  implementation  under  the  Kountché‑regime  than  now  under
turbulent fumbling democracy. Such a hypothesis is of course futile, and it is also at best
only partly true. While tenure disputes were fairly successfully held down by the military
government, they were only held down ‑ they were neither solved definitively or made
not to have ever happened, as was vainly hoped. It could be asked whether the military
government would have conducted the tenure negotiation processes in a way which was
not reversed at the eventual conclusion of their rule.
By way of conclusion
58 The  incongruity  between  the  ideal  claims  to  legitimacy  and  the  actual  motives  for
submission to state and party institutions is not reserved for the Nigerien experience,
rather it could be argued that it is a general schism of any state.
59 Berry  argues  that  negotiability  of  rules  and relationships  is  one  of  the  fundamental
characteristics of African societies. (Berry 1993) Indeed, the cases presented above seem
to  conl1rm  her  statement.  I  think,  however,  it  could  be  successfully  argued  that
negotiability  is  what  characterizes  any  society ;  the  form  of  negotiation  is  what
distinguishes them. When democracy was introduced through a constitution as the new
legitimate  form of  social  negotiation,  it  seems to  have  suffered from the  impossible
modem ambition of state building ; that society must henceforth be conducted within the
framework of democracy rather than the opposite ;  that democracy was inserted into
society with already existing forms of negotiation. This seems to have affected the other
ambitious modernization effort : the Rural Code.
60 While  the  Rural  Code  has  been  an  effort  to  modernize  the  land  tenure  system  by
formalizing  rights  in  land  through  local  negotiations  and  tenure  commissions  and
thereby  increase  tenure  security,  politization  and  competition  between  the  involved
institutions  has  led  to  increasing  insecurity :  not  only  does  democracy  question  the
authority of the traditional institutions, but the intense political competition engenders
unpredictability at a higher pace. The embryonic modernity permeating the area of legal
procedures  in  land  questions in  Niger  is  thus  not  one  of  disenchanted  rational
predictability  as  foretold  by  Weber,  but  one  of  disenchanted  composite  rational
unpredictability.
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61 As a piece of social engineering the Rural Code seems still to be some considerable way
from the desired outcome. It has, however, in conjuncture with the advent of democracy
released new social processes which could transform the rural society quite substantially.
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NOTES
1.The tenure commission is composed of the Sous‑Préfet who presides over it ; the
Secrétaire Permanent du Code Rural (in the case of Mariga the Chef de Service de
l'Environnement), the heads of the local ministerial departments concerned with rural
development, the traditional chiefs concerned and representatives of the farmers', the
herders', the women's and the youth organizations. The commission is supposed to
conciliate in tenure disputes and oversee the establishment of the "dossier rural" for a
piece of land ‑ the transitional tenurial stage leading 10 private property (Comité National
du Code Rural 1993 : art 1 and 116‑21).
2.The state is conceptualized as a complex institutional ensemble in which one should not
expect to find a unitary, unified, coherent agency, but one where various potential
structural powers are inscribed in the institutions. (See Moore 1978 : 18, 56 ; Jessop 1990 :
365‑67).
3.All names and locations below the Department level are pseudonyms.
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